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1. Introduction: 
Low income elasticity of demand was a key ingredient in the development of the 
Prebisch-Singer "Theory of Unequal Exchange"(prebisch (1949) (cited in Love (1987» and 
Singer (1950». According to the theory income growth leads to a deterioration in the 
developing countries Tenns of Trade as the share of the income spent on primary products 
declines. Moreover, the associated deterioration in welfare is exacerbated due to differences 
in market structure. Since primary products are sold in competitive markets, the benefits of 
technical advance are transferred to the industrialized countries (IC's) through lower prices 
for primary products. Over time, due to the fall in the prices of primary products the 
industrialized countries benefit from growth in production, relative to those of manufactured 
products. However, with market power on the part of Industrialized Countries Technical 
advance in industrial production benefits the IC's relatively more because technological 
progress does not reduce prices for manufactured products to the same degree1• 
The Prebisch-Singer (PS) hypothesis generated a lot of controversy. A large empirical 
literature noted that their empirical evidence in particular was subject to a numerous 
problems2• One problem was the choice of the initial and the tenninal year. Another, was 
the valuation of primary products at cif (cost-insurance-freight) and fob (free on board) 
prices3• Then there are the problems of quality and weight changes, technological change, 
The policy implication Prebisch derived from this theory of unequaI exchange was that an LDC should 
form manufacturing industries instead of following comparative advantage in the production of primary 
products. Pursuit of comparative advantage was myopic because the LDCs necessarily would lose in the long 
ron from deterioration in the tenns of trade. 
2 Prebisch anaIyzed the tenns of trade of the United Kingdom for the period 1876-80 o 1946-47. Great 
Britain was main1y an exporter of manufactured products and importer of primary products. Tenns of trade 
thus were expected to improve for Great Britain. Singer cited data for the time after 1950, excluding petroleum 
after 1973 (p. 1653, BaIassa (1989)). 
The ratio of fob to cif prices could show that the tenns of trade improve for both trading partners if 
transportation costs decline. 
· 
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and the availability and quality of substitutes and complements that are not controlled for in 
the data. As a result there has been less of an attempt to test the basic premise of the PS 
hypothesis. 
In this paper we use experimental methods to test the basic premise of the PS 
hypothesis. With these methods it is possible to control variables that cannot be controlled 
in the field. Valuatións of the commodities can be held constant and the problem of 
exogenous factors influencing supply and demand conditions in the initial, or terminal year, 
can be minimized. There are no changes in qualities and/or weights of products. The 
players in the experiments are trading fictitious commodities of constant quality over time, 
reflected by induced valuations (see Smith, 1976) for the commodities that does not change 
over time. 
The experimental results do not support the PS hypothesis. The monopolist is unable 
to exploit its market power and terms of trade for the developing countries improve as 
income grows. The experimental results contradict the theoretical predictions. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section JI the experimental design is described. 
In Section III we present the experimental results. Section IV concludes. 
II. The Experimental Desi~n 
The Environment 
The basic premise of the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is tested. Given the low income 
elasticity of demand for primary products and the 'market-power' of the industrialized 
countries does an increase in income result in a worsening of TOr for the primary product 
producer (the developing country)? Thus, in the experimental design a single industrialized 
country (a monopoly) trades with four LDCs. The LDCs are not allowed to communicate 
and hence there is no room for explicit collusion. 
, 
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There are four LDCs and one industrialized country in the experimental designo As 
a result the industrialized country is a monopsony in the primary product market (henceforth 
market X) and a monopoly in the manufactured product market (henceforth market Y). 
Despite the fact that the main interest of this study is the net barter tenns of trade, the 
number of units of good X exchanged for good Y, experimental money is introduced in aH 
designs. In every period, each agent (i) is endowed with a certain amount of money, M¡.4 
The exchange rate (from experimental money to doHars) is private infonnation. Money is 
used because it helps the process of equilibration5 and it serves as a medium of exchange. 
This last feature is especiaHy important, since without money problems of indivisibility of 
cornmodities occur. 
A set of utility functions, reflecting inelastic income elasticity of dem~nd for primary 
products is derived from fairly general Engel curves, where as income increases a decreasing 
proportion is spent on X. From the Engel curves, the Marshallian demand is derived and 
then the expenditiure function. Subsequently, via the indirect utility function the direct utility 
function is derived. 6 If subjects are maximizing their profits in the experimental setting, 
they are behaving as if they have the preferences defined above.? 
With the introduction of money the maximization problem changes slightly, since 
payoffs are derived from both utility (from holding goods X and Y at the end of each period) 
and from trading. A developing country maximizes, 
This amount should not be regarded as a budget constraint. It is sufficient to cover aH reasonable 
transactions. 
Money is an "obvious feature of any weH-functioning market process". Noussair, Plon, Riezman 
(1995), p. 3 
6 For the exact procedure and parametrization see Michelitsch (1993). 
7 For details on induced preferences see Smith (1976). 
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(1) 
and an industrialized country maximizes, 
(2) 
Where, Wx¡ (WYj) are the resource endowments of good X (Y) for a developing 
(industrialized) country and the non-negativity constraints for the final allocation, Xi, Yi, Xj 
and Yj >O. The budget constraints (as noted earlier Mi is chosen such that it is not binding) 
for the LDC 
(3 ) 
and for the industrialized country. 
(4) 
Assuming price taking behavior, a more stringent result than the equality of the 
marginal rate of substitution (MRSxy) and the price ratio (pJpy) is derived for the competitive 
equilibrium. Since utility is expressed in monetary terms, in equilibrium the marginal utility 
of X (ux) has to equal the price of X (Px) and the marginal utility of y (Uy) has to equal the 
price of Y (Py). Therefore, it is possible to test whether in each market prices converge to 
the equilibrium or no1. 
One possible problem in the experimental design is that subjects can go bankrup1. 
To avoid this8 subjects are given a starting capital of $5.9 In addition to this subjects are 
trained several times without salient rewards to improve their understanding of the institution. 
Parameterization 
8 This is done as experimental subjects can not be asked to pay debts they accumulate in an experimento 
9 The subjects receive their payoffs at the end of a series of experiments. This made it unlikely that the 
total payoff over all experiments is negative, and indeed the lowest payoff was greater than $9. 
10 
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A linear transfonnation of the fonn is chosen (12). The parameters values chosen 
are, a=0.9, {3=0.8, 1'=2000,0=1001°. 
(5) 
The choice of the parameter {3, the income elasticity of demand, is especiaHy 
important. For the laboratory market 0.8 was chosen. This is the parameter Prebisch used 
for the numerical example in his original paper (1959). 
Up to a certain point aH income is spent on the primary product, X. In this region, 
where Y =0, preferences can be represented by a lexicographic preference ordering. The 
same choice behavior is observed if an individual cares only about good X. The foHowing 
functional form is chosen, with, 17=300 and jl=0.25, to represent such preferences. 
(6)U (x, y) =" *x~ 
The payoff tables for different combinations of final holdings of x and y, as weH as two 
tables with the marginal utilities of x respectively y (given certain holdings of the other 
cornmodity) are given to the subjects. AH three tables are given to the subjects during the 
training session, and again at the beginning of each experiment. AH payoffs are in 
experimental Shillings, which are converted into U.S. doHars at a certain rateo The only 
difference between the tables used in the training session and the ones used in the subsequent 
experiments is that they are multiplied by a constant factor. 
The Experimental Design (Table 1) 
Four LDCs face a single industrial country (monopoly/monopsony). Four experiments 
Note, that this utility function can only be derived for an interior solution (x> O, y> O). 
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were conducted, each experiment consisted of a 'trainer'll, an inexperienced and an 
experienced session. The sessions with inexperienced and experienced subjects consisted of 
a low income phase (1) followed by a high income phase (2). After the trainer, subjects 
participate in two more sessions, first as inexperienced, then as experienced subjects. For 
our purposes only the data from experienced subjects is used. 
In the second phase the endowment (ofboth the industrialized country and the LDCs) 
is doubled in order to achieve a substantial effect on the equilibrium predictions. This is 
done to study the effect of lower income elasticity of demand for the primary product (X). 
The endowments are chosen to be Wx=S (10) for the LDCs and, Wy=lO (20) for the 
industrialized country (IC) in phase 1 (2). 
Table-2 gives an overview of the parameterization of the experiments as well as the 
allocations, prices, and trading quantities which would occur given a competitive equilibrium. 
<table-2 here> 
Trading Institution 
The multiple unit double auction mechanism (MUDA)12 trading institution is used. 
MUDA is chosen for two reasons, first, it allows simultaneous trading in multiple markets 
and, second, the double auction mechanism has good convergence properties. This is 
particularly important because it is difficult to reach a General Equilibrium in two distinct 
markets at the same time. 13.14 
11 The trainer wasused to familiarize subjeets with the trading institution, the payoff tables and the 
aceounting procedures. To leam the trading institution, subjeets went through a eomputerized training program, 
which allowed them to trade with eomputerized traders. For a discussion on how the trainer was ron see 
Appendix. 
12 For a deseription of MUDA see Plott (1991). 
13 For a test of the eompetitive model in multiple markets (but additively separable demand) see Noussair, 
Plott, Riezman (1992). The authors report that in their multi-market environment only the qualitative 
predietions of the eompetitive model hold. 
14 
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Subjects are not allowed to cancel bids or asks. However, in all experiments subjects 
are in the position of a trader, Le., they can buy and sell units in both markets. This feature 
essentially enables subjects to erase their own offer, or bid, by accepting it. The reason for 
putting subjects in the role of a trader was to ease the process of equilibration. 
In this complex environment it is possible to sell more units than the equilibrium 
quantity. The following example and figure-1 clarify this. Overtrading can be observed 
because of, both, the sequential character of the double auction and the interlinked demands 
in the two markets. Suppose that prices in both markets are within the equilibrium range, for 
instance in phase 1, at 100 in both markets. The supply and demand curves (SO and DO 
respectively) indicate the initial position of a developing country, endowed with 8 units of 
X and no unit of Y. At a price of 100 it is profitable to sell up to seven units of X, more 
than the equilibrium quantity of four. Suppose, the country sells six units of X. Holding 
two units of X and no units of Y it is profitable to buy two units of Y at a price of 100. 
Since the marginal value of X increases with the amount of Y a country holds it is now 
profitable to buy two units of X. After this transaction, the country now possesses four units 
of X and two units of Y, the equilibrium quantities. The country has exploited all potential 
gains from trade at these prices (or, for any price within the equilibrium range). It has done 
so by acting both as a seller and a buyer of X. Likewise a sequence of profitable trades is 
A transaction in the double auction can be initiated by either buyers or sellers. Buyers can submit a 
bid which is higher than tbe standing bid. This bid becomes the standing bid. If a seller accepts the bid a 
transaction takes place with tbe price equal to tbe standing bid. Alternatively, a buyer can accept the standing 
offer. in which case a transaction takes place with the price equal to tbe standing offer. A seller can submit 
an offer which is lower than the standing offer. Tbis offer becomes tbe standing offer. Tbe double auction 
does not offer a structural advantage to either side of tbe market, Le., prices tend to converge to tbe competitive 
equilibrium (and not to stay above, or below, it). 
-
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possible in which a country acts both as a buyer and se1ler of y15. 
For the analysis of prices a1l transaction prices are taken into account. However, net 
quantities are reported, Le., sales (purchases) by LDCs minus purchases (sales) by LDCs in 
market X (Y). 16 
Common Features of the Data Analysis 
Due to the introduction of money into the system, and as utility is expressed in 
monetary terms, separate equilibrium predictions for both markets can be derived. The 
market for the primary product (market X) is analyzed first. This is fo1lowed by the analysis 
of the market for manufactured products (market Y). 
The fo1lowing econometric model is used to analyze the change in prices over time l7 • 
Where, PI is defined as the difference between the transaction price, PI' and the equilibrium 
prediction (EQ). The function f[T(t) - T(t-l)] allows for a shift of prices at the beginning 
of the periodo The functional form considered. was f(.) = [(T(t) - T(t-l»/T(t)]. This 
functional form implies that the shift decreases with the number of periods. Using prices 
15 At these prices buying three units of Y is profitable, then selling four units of X and selling one unit 
ofY. 
16 Subjects were recruited from undergraduate economics c1asses at tbe University of Arizona. Each 
participant was paid $20 for showing up on time for aH three sessions of the experiment. Subjects earned, in 
addition to that, salient rewards, depending on tbeir decisions, ranging from about $10 to $85. For each subject 
group all sessions took place within one week. 
17 AH models considered allowed for a change of prices over time. Let lhe t and T denote observation 
number (counted from lhe beginning of tbe experiment) and period number, respectively. The model PI = ex 
+ l3*exp(-t) + El assumes a constant rate of convergence from one observation to lhe next where ex is the 
asymptotic equilibrium prediction. A significant coefficient on exp(-t) indicates lhat prices change over time 
(they increase if 13 is negative, decrease if 13 is positive). The model PI = ex + l3*exp(-t) t El assumes that prices 
are constant within a period and change at a constant rate across periods. The coefficients have similar 
interpretations as in lhe previous model. In botb models 13 was usually positive and significant, indicating a 
decrease of prices both wilhin a period and across periods. 
Neither model predicted very accurately (very low R2), since they failed to take into account 
simultaneously the change in price across periods and across transactions. A decrease of this forro, saw-tooth, 
was a common pattero observed in many experiments. 
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lagged by one period as independent variable substantially reduces the (positive) 
autocorrelation. 
The parameters of the model can be interpreted as follows. The asymptotic 
equilibrium prediction is defmed by EQ + ex/(l-{3), ex =0 indicates convergence to the 
equilibrium prediction EQ. The choice of EQ does not affect the asymptotic prediction, it 
only changes the value and the standard error of the estimated constant tenn ex. If the 
absolute value of {3 ~ 1, the model does not converge to any particular point, {3 <Oimplies 
that prices overshoot the equilibrium (but eventuaHy converge if the absolute value is less 
than one), 1>(3 >Ogreater than zero implies convergence at a constant rate to an equilibrium 
from one direction, 'Y> «) Oindicates that prices shift upward (downward) when the period 
changes. 
Terms of trade are calculated as the ratio of the average transaction price in the 
primary product market (X) divided by the average transaction price in the manufactured 
good market (Y). For the statistical analysis only one measure of the terms of trade per 
phase of an experiment was used. This is the ratio of the average of the contract prices in 
the Iast three periods in market X and Y. This procedure reduces each experiment to two 
observations, namely the final terms of trade for phase 1 and two. Statistical tests are 
therefore conducted for aH experiments within each designo 
In aH cases the competitive equilibrium is not a specific price but a range of prices. 
Prices were said to be at the competitive equilibrium if either of the foHowing hypotheses 
could not be rejected: 
a) ex = O, against the alternative ex > O, when the high endpoint of the competitive 
range entered the statistical model as equilibrium prediction (EQ). 
b) ex = O, against the alternative ex < O, when the low endpoint of the competitive 
10 
range was used for EQ. 
If the asymptotic equilibrium prediction (which is independent of the choice of EQ) 
is within the competitive range, neither hypothesis can be rejected. If the high (low) end of 
the equilibrium range is entered as EQ and the result is that a is greater (less) than zero it 
is not necessary to test the other hypothesis. 
The following abbreviations used in the text. PIXE3Y represents design lIl, phase 
1, experienced subjects, experirnent 3, market y18. 
III. Experimental Results 
According to the monopoly/monopsony model, the IC should be able to lower prices 
in market X and to increase prices in market Y (compared to the competitive equilibrium, 
CE). Consequently, the tenns of trade are expected to be worse than in the competitive 
equilibrium. 
AH subjects in the role of the IC are able to raise the price in their output market 
substantially aboye the competitive level, though not always to the level predicted by the 
monopoly model. Prices in market Y usually decrease from phase 1 to phase 2, 
contradicting the monopoly model. Tenns of trade (ToT) are usually below the CE, but 
aboye the level predicted by the monopoly model. ToT for the experienced subjects increase 
in three cases. Earnings of experienced industrialized countries are between the competitive 
level and the monopoly leve!. Earnings of LDCs are usually below the competitive leve!. 
The Market for PrimaD' Products 
The monopsony model predicts that prices in market X should be lower than the 
This annotation is shortened to XE3 in tables and graphs. 18 
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competitive equilibriurn19and decrease, but the rnonopoly fails to exploit its market power. 
The average contract prices are displayed in figure-2. 
In the beginnning of phase 1 in rnarket X prices are volatile in sorne experiments but, 
stabilize in the later periods. Prices are generally within the competitive range at the end of 
phase 1, with the exception of one experimento At the end of phase 2, prices are above the 
competitive equilibrium in two experiments. On1y in experiment 1 are prices consistentIy 
c10se to the monopsony prediction. In experiment 3, prices are c10se to the monopsony 
prediction in phase 1, but substantially above the competitive level in phase 2. 
Convergence 
All asymptotic predictions in phase 1 are within the competitive range or below the 
lower bound (CEL) but, usually above the monopsony prediction. The results using 
(EQ=CEL) in phase 1 and (EQ=CEH) in phase 220 are in Table-5. Whether prices 
converge to CEL in phase 1, or to the monopsony prediction, is not c1ear. Convergence to 
either CEL cannot be rejected21 in most cases. ün1y in experiment 1 prices converge to the 
monopsony leve122 • The asymptotic predictions for phase 2 are usually above CEH, the 
difference is often significant23 • The exception is again experiment 1, where prices are 
below CEL and not significantIy different from the monopsony prediction. {3 is positive and 
less than one, indicating convergence towards equilibrium from one side. In most cases {3 
19 The competitive range in phase 1 (two) is 74-105 (37-43), the monopsony model predicts 64 (27), thus 
in both phases only 10 Shillings below the low end of the competitive range. 
20 For experiment 1 the results for EQ = CEL are presented. 
21 In PIXE4X prices converge into the competitive range and are significantly different from the 
monopsony prediction. 
22 In experiment 1, prices converge to even below the monopsony level (significance level of 1%). 
23 Prices are significantly greater than CEH in experiments 3 and 4. 
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is significant24, 'Y usualIy is not significant. This indicates that prices in market X do not 
shift at the beginning of periods2S • 
Market for Manufactured Products 
In the market for rnanufactured products the IC has rnarket power as a seller. The 
predictions of the rnonopoly model exceed the CE26• 
The average contract prices (figure-3) in all periods are aboye the high end of the 
competitive range (CEH) and below the monopoly leve!. Prices stay fairly close to the 
monopoly prediction on1y in phase 1 of experiment 3. Prices slowly but consistently fall in 
the second phase of that experiment. Figure-4 displays the problem a monopoly faces. For 
example, in period one in experiment 4, the rnonopolist charges prices relatively close to 
the (single price) monopoly level and sells four units. The monopolist then sells one unit 
for substantially less, which reveals to the LDCs that they can acquire units at a lower price. 
In period two, on1y two units are sold at high prices, afterwards prices drop again 
substantially. In period three the monopolist holds out for a long time until finally the LDCs 
buy at fairly high prices. From then on average prices drop, since on1y one, or two, units 
are sold at high prices. In phase 2, even this ceases to work after period three, and on1y by 
holding out for a long time in period eight is the monopolist able to raise the price of at least 
one unit per period to higher levels. 
The pattems of contract prices provides sorne insights into buyer behavior. When the 
rnonopolist tries to price-discriminate sorne buyers 'leam' that the monopolist sells cheaper, 
and subsequently withhold their dernand until the seller concedes. Not all buyers, however, 
24 The exeeptions are P1XE1X, P1XE3X and P1XE4X. 
2S The exeeptions are P2XE3X and P2XE4X (r > O). 
26 The eompetitive equilibrium in phase 1 (2) is 89·137 (67-82), the monopo1y prediction is 599 (70S). 
------------------------,-----'------------
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take the 'risk' to wait until the end of the period, since it is possible to be excluded from the 
market because of the time constraint. 
Convergence (Table-6) 
Generally prices converge from aboye to a level at, or aboye, the competitive 
equilibrium. For purposes of analysis of convergence, the equilibrium prediction used to 
calculate the differences was the high end of the competitive price range (CEH). This is 
done as prices tend to be aboye the competitive equilibrium27in aH the experiments. Note, 
a significant a implies that prices are different from the initial equilibrium prediction (EQ). 
The asymptotic prediction is always aboye CEH and always below the monopoly 
level. Prices, in most cases are significantly different from both CEH and the monopoly 
prediction28 • The coefficient {3 is always positive and less than one 1 and usually 
significant29 indicating convergence of prices to levels between the competitive and the 
monopoly prediction, 'Y is always positive and usuaHy significan~o, indicating an upward 
shift of prices in market Y at the beginning of periods. This pattem is quite typical, as is 
seen in figure-4. The only exception is experiment 3, where prices are extremely stable 
until the last two periods of the second phase. The pattem of prices of this 'outlier' is 
displayed in figure-5. 
An explanation for the general decrease of prices and their shift at the beginning of 
27 As mentioned earlier, the choice of EQ in the equation (PI = PI - EQ) does not affect the asymptotic 
equilibrium prediction (ASY). only the value of the coefficient o: and its standard deviation. In the one case 
where ASY was below the competitive range a second regression was conducted with EQ equal to the low end 
of the competitive range to test whether o: was significantly different from zero. 
28 o: is not significantly different from zero in PIXEl Y and P2XE3Y (using the monopoly prediction) 
respectively P2XEIY. P2XE3Y. 
29 The only exception is PIXE3Y. 
30 The only exception occurs in experiment 3. 
14 
a period is the specific structure of the supply and demando Profitable trades can occur weH 
above the competitive equilibrium, but not substantiaHy below it. The marginal value of X 
decreases rapidly with the number of units a country holds (for any constant holding of 
y).31 Figure-6 shows the supply and demand curves for X in phase 1, given that the market 
for manufactured products is already in equilibrium (Le. every country holds two units of 
Y). Both supply and demand curves shift as units of X are traded. To show this effect the 
curves are drawn for the case when each country has traded none, one, two and three units 
of X, respectively. The upward shift of the supply curve is negligible compared to the huge 
downward shift of the demand curve as units of X are traded. 
This feature is important to explain the evolution ofprices. Transactions are profitable 
for both trading partners at prices well above the competitive equilibrium (CE), but not at 
prices substantially below CE. The range of profitable prices becomes smaller as units of 
X are traded, also decreasing the asymmetry in the distribution of surplus. 
Tenns of Trade 
Tenns of trade are computed as ratio of the average prices in the last three periods. 
The ToT are generally below CEU2, but above the monopoly prediction (figure-7). ToT 
increase for three of the cases even though both models predict that ToT should worsen from 
phase 1 to phase 2. ToT are below CEL in phase 1 in almost aH periods. In three 
experiments ToT are fairly close to the monopoly prediction at the end of phase 1. In phase 
2, the ToT are stable and halfway between CEL and the monopoly prediction. 
Tenns of Trade in the Monopoly Design (Table-7) 
ToT are computed as ratio of the average price in the last three periods. Both the 
31 X and Y are eomplements, Le., the marginal value of X inereases with the number of units of Y. 
32 The low end of the eompetitive range. 
--------------------------------------~--
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monopoly and the competitive model predict that the ToT should worsen in design I. ToT 
increase in three experiments. This goes against the prediction of both the competitive and 
Table-7 
Terms of Trade:Design I 
Phase El E2 E3 E4 
1 0.17 0.25 0.14 0.47 
2 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.22 
the monopoly model. ToT in the last periods decrease only in experiment 4. ToT in 
experiment 4 increase during phase 1 (ToT in the final three periods are higher than in aH 
other periods) and drop drasticaHy in the last three periods of the phase 2 (before this ToT 
had never been below0.45). 
Trading Volume and Efficiencies 
The theoretical model predicts that the le should exert its market power by reducing 
the quantity in market Y, its output market. Quantity is reduced (relative to the competitive 
equilibrium) from 8 to 4 in phase 1 and from 16 to 4 in phase 2. The quantity traded is 
close to the monopoly prediction in phase 1.33 
In phase 2, quantity traded is close to the monopoly prediction in experiment 3 (where 
prices have been the highest). In other cases the quantity traded is around 8. The effect of 
restricting output and increasing price is best seen in experiment 4. Where, in phase 2 the 
monopolist sold on an average 12 units during the first 8 periods at a price around 150 
Shillings. In the last two periods it restricted sales to the monopoly level and increased the 
price to about 350. 
The average quantity traded is 4.2. During the last three periods, quantities are close to the competitive 
prediction of 8 only in one case (PIXE4Y). In this case the average contract price is also the lowest. 
16 
Both the competitive and the monopsony model predict the same trading volume in 
the primary product market. However, the quantities purchased by the monopsonist vary 
substantially across different experiments. In experiment 3 the monopsonist purchases up to 
10 units in phase 1 and 25 units in phase 2. This also explains why prices exceed the 
competitive equilibrium in phase 2. Quantities in all the other experiments are fairIy close 
to the equilibrium prediction of 4 in phase 1 and 8 in phase 2. In phase 2, experiment 1 is 
the exception. In this experiment the monopsonist paid prices very close to the monopsony 
level, but at the expense of quantity purchased. The average quantity purchased is four 
units. 
Due to the deadweight loss the monopoly model predicts efficiencies of 95 % in phase 
1and 88 % in phase 2. Efficiencies are particularly low in experiment 3, in which the 
monopsonist purchased 'too many' units at a high price in market X and also charged the 
highest price as monopolist in market Y. Efficiencies in that experiment range from 77 to 
87% during the last three periods of both phases. In the other experiments, efficiencies are 
around the level predicted by the monopoly model at the end of phase 1, and often greater 
in phase 2. 34 
Earnings 
Earnings are defined as the sum of the redemption values for the final holding of X 
and Y plus (or, minus) the trade surplus. 3s The values in the text are the average earnings 
in the last three periods of each phase. 
34 Efficiency can drop drastically, for example, in the last period of P2XE2 efficiency drops from 94 to 
80% after the average contract price in market Y increased from 141 to 198..  
35 Trade surplus is defined as revenues from sales minus expenditures on purchases. The reason for using 
earnings for comparisons and not trade surplus is that the latter is not very meaningful. A country can generate 
a high trade surplus by selling all its units and nevertheless not be in a very good position, because the 
redemption value is zero. This situation is comparable to a developing country exporting food while part of 
the population is starving. 
---------------------------,--------------------
17 
The competitive model predicts that the IC should eam (CEH =) 1960 in phase 1 and 
(CEH=) 2580 in phase 2. The earnings are lower than those predicted by the monopoly 
model (3560 and 4636). The earnings of LDC predicted by the competitive model (phase 
one: CEL = 960, phase 2: CEL = 1310) are higher than those predicted by the monopoly 
model (488 and 559). In all the experiments the average earnings realized by LDC are 
always higher than the monopoly prediction and lower than CEL. The earnings of the 
monopolists are between the monopoly prediction and aboye the CEH level36 • 
Experiment 3 is the exception, where, in the last four periods in phase 2 earnings of 
the monopsonist are below CEL. This is the case because the IC purchased a greater number 
of units of X at a higher price than is predicted by the competitive model. 
Conclusion: 
The industrialized country is unable to keep prices below the competitive equilibrium 
as monopsonists in market X.' At the same time as monopolists in market Y they are able 
to charge prices which are higher than the competitive equilibrium. The buyers, unlike the 
sellers, cannot exploit their market power in this environment the sellers are able to do so. 
Tenns of trade are usually between the competitive range and the monopoly level. Tenns 
of trade increase from phase 1 to phase 2, contradicting the monopoly model. The single 
IC is unable to exploit its market power to the full extent. 
The pure prediction of the Prebisch-Singer (PS) theory of unequal exchange does not 
hold. The monopoly (lC) is unable to lower prices of the primary product. However, it is 
able to alter the ToT in its favor as it is able to increase the price of the manufactured good. 
The PS thus tends to overstate the effect on ToT in this setting. In addition, TOT improve 
36 Earnings are below CEH (but aboye CEL) in only 4 periods of 40 in phase 1, and in 3 periods of 30 
(without experiment 3) in phase 2. 
18 
as income increases thus contradicting the PS theory. 
19 
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Appendix: Trainer session. 
Subjects received L-shaped squares which allowed them to identify profitable trades in 
each market, given their current holding of X and Y. These squares provided the following 
information: "It is profitable to buy below ... ", pointing to the marginal value of an additional 
unit in that market. "It is profitable to sell above ... ", pointing to the marginal value of the last 
unit owned. Copies of the squares are printed in the appendix. After the computerized training 
program subjects participated in three to six training periods with exact1y the same features as 
the actual two experiments in which they participated during the subsequent two sessions. They 
did not receive any payoff for the first round of the trainer. Subjects also had the possibility to 
practice the cornmunication option the MUDA software offers for subjects in design 111, in which 
cornmunication is allowed. During the trainer in design 111 the subjects were not allowed to talk 
before each periodo This was done because oral cornmunication was thought of as not needing 
practice. During the training periods subjects had extensive opportunity to ask questions as well 
as to check their accounting. During the first two periods of the trainer the accounting of all 
subjects was checked, later on1y questions answered. The accounting was verified before subjects 
carne back for the subsequent session. 
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